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PLEADING
THOMAS M. STUBBS*
There were no statutory changes in the subject of Pleading dur-
ing 1955. The Supreme Court had for consideration during the
period under review over a third more cases involving pleading
questions than were dealt with in the Survey of a year ago. Most of
these cases were of the usual or routine type, only a few of these
being in any sense unique or requiring the decision of points of first
impression.
Actions and Parties
Williams v. United Insurance Co.1 involved an action for damages,
on a health insurance policy. The complaint alleged issuance of a poli-
cy to complainant by defendant's predecessor, which assumed latter's
obligations; payment of premiums by complainant to defendant's
agent for four and one-half years; advice to complainant by defen-
dant's agent that the predecessor had gone out of business and destruc-
tion by said agent of complainant's premium receipt book; complain-
ant's lack of education, and even of knowledge of agent's name, or
of what to do under the circumstances; of payment of premiums
weekly by complainant to defendant's agent up to the time of destruc-
tion of the receipt book (a period of four and one-half years) and read-
iness to pay thereafter, and complainant's subsequent illness, medical
expenses, etc., was held, on demurrer, to state a cause of action. The
result here seems entirely logical. Complainant's cause of action
here was of a nature requiring a statement of facts in considerable
detail in order to make admissible the pertinent evidence. Proof of
the alleged facts should undeniably warrant recovery.
Gardner v. Mutual Benefit Health & c. Assn.2 is somewhat analo-
gous to the Williams case, supra. Here there was an action for actual
and punitive damages by a policy-holder against an insurance company.
It alleged false representations of latter's agent, whereby complainant
was induced to discontinue a similar policy with another insurance
company (as being less advantageous than the policy issued by defen-
dant, which was untrue in fact), and for false and fraudulent entries
by said agent on questionnaire of the answers given by complainant
to questions propounded by agent in regard to medical history of
cAssoctato Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 86 S.E. 2d 486 (S.C. 1955).
2. 226 S.C. 219, 84 S.E. 2d 637 (1954).
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-complainant's wife (now deceased), because of which defendant de-
nied liability for payment to complainant of substantial claims for
medical and hospital expenses incurred as the result of prolonged
illness of complainant's wife. Defendant moved to strike ten out of
the twenty-three paragraphs of the complaint, in which agent's alleged
fraud and misconduct, as stated above, were averred. The trial court
overruled the motion and, on appeal, was affirmed. The reviewing
court stating:
The allegations of complaint . . . state a cause of action for
fraud and deceit in that false representations were made by
[said] agent to respondent, which led to cancellation [by latter]
of an insurance policy then in force with [another company] and
such allegations relative to policy with the defendant company
may be relevant upon the question of damages . . .
Here the allegations of the complaint which were objected to
'were pertinent and necessary in order to state the kind of cause of
action involved. The court, therefore, very properly refused to
strike them as being "irrelevant and redundant" under Code of Laws
.of South Carolina, 1952 § 10-606.
Harmon v. Aughtry,8 involved an action for damages for breach
by defendant of a contract to make a will in favor of complainant's
wife, or in favor of complainant should his wife predecease him,
and for an equitable lien in the sum of $6,000 on certain real estate of
defendant, in consideration of complainant's advance of $6,000 to
defendant to pay off the then existing mortgage upon said property.
It was alleged that defendant failed to execute said will as agreed
and that complainant was entitled to rescission of the agreement. Up-
,on defendant's motion, complainant was put to an election as between
the causes of action so stated, and complainant elected to proceed for
damages for breach of contract. Thereafter defendant demurred to
the remaining cause as stating no cause of action. The demurrer was
sustained and, on appeal, this was affirmed, upon the ground that
the contract alleged in the complaint could be performed at any time
during defendant's life-time; that defendant had not repudiated it;
that complainant was not entitled to treat it as rescinded by mere
failure, so far, of defendant to make a will, and to recover the $6,000
advanced. In short, that the action was premature. The view of
the court here is amply sustained by the authorities that averment
of breach of contract by defendant is essential to the statement of a
-cause of action therefor, and that so long as time for its performance
3 .... S.E. 2d - (S.C. 1955).
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by defendant has not expired it cannot be said to have been breached,
and, more particularly, that "A will [as agreed to] -may be made
at any time during the life of the promisor." The latter statement
accords with the general authorities on the subject and with the
earlier South Carolina case of Ex parte Hineline.
4
Stephens v. Hendricks.5 Here there was an action by an automo-
bile owner against a delinquent tax-collector to recover possession
of complainant's automobile, seized by latter as the property of one
who owned a parking lot on which complainant's car was found. The
lot-owner being delinquent as to taxes. Defendant demurred to
complaint as stating no cause of action in that the complaint failed
to aver payment of taxes under protest as prerequisite to bringing
a suit for relief therefor.6 A demurrer was sustained by the trial
court, and, on appeal, this was reversed, as above cited statute was
inapplicable to the owner of a car against whom no taxes were
levied. Another question raised in this case, more properly classi-
fied under the caption "defenses", was that the complainant did not
anticipate the defense that he had not complied with the applicable
bailment statute,7 and avoidance of such defense. But, said the court,
complainant is not bound in his complaint to anticipate defenses.
Such is the general rule and the view previously taken in South
Carolina. A. M. Law & Co. v. Cleveland.8
In Hall v. Walters, et al.,9 there was an action by a non-union work-
man against six named executives and members of Textile Union,
Local No. 254, for damages, actual and punitive, for conspiracy pre-
venting complainant from working during a strike, using threats and
the like, thus depriving complainant of his right to work. Defendants
demurred for no cause of action, under CODE ov LAWS Ov SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-642 (6), in that (1) the alleged acts were
not actionable and (2) the strike was not unlawful. A demurrer was
overruled by the trial court. Verdict and judgment were entered
for the complainant for $1,000 actual, and $25,000 punitive damages.
On appeal, an order overruling the demurrer was sustained. The
court cited Sections 10-215, 10-429, and 10-1516,10 as to suits against
unincorporated associations, service of process therein, and the per-
4. 166 S.C. 352, 164 S.E. 887 (1932).
5. 226 S.C. 79, 83 S.E. 2d 634 (1954).
6. Under CoDE OF LAWS o SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 65-1464 through
65-1467.
7. CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-308.
8. 172 S.C. 200, 173 S.E. 638 (1934).
9 .... S.E. 2d .... (S.C. 1955).
10. CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROrINA, 1952.
[Vol.&
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sons and property bound by judgments against such associations.
While this appears to be a case of first impression in South Caro-
lina in a factual situation of this kind, the authorities cited by the
court from other jurisdictions amply support the view that the com-
plaint stated a cause of action.
In Turn&, et al. v. Byars, et al.,11 questions were raised both as
to parties and proper defenses. Here the action was for partition
of land to which occupant, under claim of right, was named as one
of the defendants. The latter, by demurrer,12 purported to raise
the question of defect of parties, in that some of the heirs at law of
the deceased owner of land in question were not named as parties.
The overruling of the demurrer by the trial court was affirmed on
appeal on the ground that the defect, not appearing upon face of
the complaint, could only be taken by the answer,18 and, further, that
the complaint stated a cause of action against appellant in that it was
alleged that he "now occupies the house on the above described land
and makes some claim thereto."' 4 The court cites an abundance of
well-reasoned South Carolina authority for both propositions.
Trawick v. One International Pickup.15 In an attachment pro-
ceeding against an offending motor vehicle by one who suffered
personal injuries and property damage as a result of the alleged
negligent operation thereof it was held that the court below did
not err in allowing the true owner of the vehicle to intervene in
the proceedings, 16 she being a proper, though not a necessary party,
in that she had an interest in the subject-matter of the controversy,
but that it was error for the trial court to require complainant to
amend his pleadings so as to state a cause of action in personain
against said intervenor. The order of intervention here was held to
be within the trial court's discretion, yet one who so intervenes should
not be allowed to dictate to the complainant as to whether the action
so brought shall be in rein, in personan, or both, as the complainant
may elect to bring it in the form he chooses. The record in this case
is incomplete, says the court, and possibly this accounts for the fact,
or furnishes the reason why, it would not have been to complainant's
advantage to have had the intervenor as a defendant.
11. 226 S.C. 289, 85 S.E. 2d 100 (1954).
12. CoDne OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-642 (4).
13. CODE ov LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-642 (4), 10-645.
14. CODE Or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-203.
15. 225 S.C. 321, 82 S.E. 2d 275 (1954).
16. Under CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-203 and 10-219.
19551
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Defenses
In Thomas & Howard Co. v. Fowler,'7 to an action by a mort-
gagee in claim and delivery for possession of a stock of goods covered
by the mortgage, the trial court sustained demurrers to mortgagor's
answer and counterclaim, alleging in substance that the mortgagee's
agent, as part of a general fraudulent scheme to induce the mort-
gagor to execute the note and mortgage, falsely promised, with no
intention of fulfilling it, that he would not record the mortgage.
Further that the mortgage was recorded, as result of which the mort-
gagor could not obtain further credit and was damaged as a result
thereof. On review the trial court's order sustaining the demurrers
was reversed as the answer was held to, state a good defense, and a
counterclaim is not subject to demurrer if it contains any allegations
which entitle the pleader to relief. Here the reviewing court held
that the counterclaim stated a cause of action for fraudulent breach
of contract, and, as such, a demurrer thereto could not be properly
sustained.' 8  Certainly there is a well-established line of South
Carolina cases to the effect that a demurrer should not be sus-
tained to an original complaint or to a counterclaim if it states any
cause of action entitling the pleader to relief.
Gause v. Jones.'9 A policyholder brought an action against an in-
surance company and its agent for alleged fraud on the part of the
agent in selling him a hospital and surgical policy upon which the
insurance company denied liability upon the ground that the insured
failed to state in his application a previous history of stomach ulcers.
The agent filed a counterclaim for alleged libel against him by the
complainant by reason of a letter written to his principal by the in-
sured's attorney "some time after" the alleged fraud of the agent,
asserting facts as to the fraud and misrepresentation by the agent.
Complainant demurred to the counterclaim on the ground that the
cause of action pleaded therein does not arise out of the same state
of facts, nor is it similar to the cause of action alleged in complaint.
The overruling of the demurrer by the trial court was affirmed on
appeal. The true test of the propriety of a counterclaim as such,20
said the reviewing court, is whether the acts complained of therein
are so connected with those upon which the complaint is founded
that it can be said that the counterclaim is based upon a denial of
the issues raised in the complaint. Such was the fact here. Further,
17. 225 S.C. 347,82 S.E. 2d 454 (1954).
18. Corm ov LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-642 (6).
19. 85 S.E. 2d 402 (S.C. 1955).
20. Under CODE OF LAWS O" SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-703 and 10-705.
[Vol. 8
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that "the same transaction", as used in Section 10-703, and the
"same state of facts," as used in Section 10-705, 21 are substantially
equivalent. The view of the court here follows the earlier case of
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lourie.2 2  Although the question was not
raised as such, the holding in Griffin v. Scott,28 that a counterclaim
may be pleaded by one of several defendants, was necessarily fol-
lowed.
2 4
Trials and Hearings
In Bush v. Aiken Electric Coop. Inc.2 5 complainant, alleged to be
a minor, sued defendant for personal injuries under the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine. Defendant was an electric cooperative organ-
ized under the laws of South Carolina.2 6 A demurrer by the de-
fendant raised the question as to whether it was a "charitable
corporation," and, as such, exempt from liability in tort actions. Its
motion, under Section 10-606,27 raised the question as to whether
the complainant should be required to make his complaint more de-
finite and certain by stating his precise age. The trial court overruled
both the demurrer and motion, and, on appeal, was sustained as to
both. The mere fact that defendant was a "non-profit" enterprise
did not make it a charitable organization, and the act in question
does not exempt it from tort liability. As to the motion to make
more definite and certain, defendant (appellant) admitted before
the trial court that it had knowledge of complainant's age, and,
moreover, this fact was a matter of record in Edgefield County. The
court casts serious doubt upon the appealability, before final judg-
ment, of a trial court's order on this motion.
28
The court here, as to the ruling upon the motion, follows the logi-
cal view stated in previous South Carolina cases, as laid down in 49
C.J. § 738, that:
A pleading will not be ordered to be made more definite and
certain . . . where it appears that the moving party already
has, or can obtain, sufficient knowledge .... or is in a position
of knowing the facts superior to the position of the pleader, or
where the facts sought are peculiarly within the knowledge of
the moving party.
21. CODM OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
22. 201 S.C. 478, 23 S.E. 2d 741 (1942).
23. 203 S.C. 430, 27 S.E. 2d 570 (1943).
24. See CODg OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-1503, 10-1508.
25. 85 S.E. 2d 716 (S.C. 1955).
26. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 12-1001 through 12-1083.
27. CoDm op' LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
28. See Thomas and Howard Co. v. Fowler, note 45 infra.
1955]
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In Wildhagen, et al. v. Ayers,2 9 an action for damages for unlawful
distraint of personal property, complainant, upon the trial court's
order to do so, failed to amend his complaint so as to make it more
definite and certain. The trial court thereafter entered an order
"impliedly" refusing complainant's motion for an order of voluntary
nonsuit, without prejudice, and expressly striking the complaint. On
appeal the latter order was reversed because the defendant made no
showing of prejudice to him beyond the probability of having to
defend another action. Circuit Court Rules 29, 30 and 59 require
the trial court to exercise judicial discretion based upon some good
reason under the circumstances, which was lacking in this instance.
Authorities cited by the court from this and other jurisdictions amply
sustain the view here taken.
Town of Bennettsville v. Bledsoe, et al.30 This was an action for
money had and received, based upon a mutual mistake of fact,
whereby the sum sued for was overpaid defendant by the plaintiff
under a construction contract. The defense that the amount overpaid
was uncertain and defendant's books were then being audited to
determine the amount was stricken by trial court as "sham",3 1 upon
filing of an affidavit by the complainant's officer, attaching thereto
a written acknowledgment by the defendant that the amount sued
for was correct. On appeal this order was affirmed, the reviewing
court observing that, while the provisions of the above Code Section
3 2
are employed infrequently, still South Carolina authority is ample
for its strict application where the sham is obvious. A leading case
in point cited by the court is that of Ocean Forest Hotel v. Wood-
side.3 3 The view taken by the court here seems entirely sound, and,
while it is not discussed, the procedure in raising the question of
"sham" by affidavit has been followed by this court since the early
case of Tharin v. Seabrook.
34
St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Dondalson,3 5 in the main, in-
volved the substantive law of bankruptcy, and, in small part, the
question of a "sham" defense. Here there was an action by a surety
against his principal for payments made by the complainant to the
State of California, under bond conditioned to pay all amounts due
said State by the defendant under its sales and use tax statutes, to-
29. 225 S.C. 384, 82 S.E. 2d 609 (1954).
30. 226 S.C. 214, 84 S.E. 2d 554 (1954).
31. CODM OF LAWS O1' SouTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-654.
32. See note 31 supra.
33. 184 S.C. 428, 192 S.E. 413 (1937).
34. 6 S.C. 113 (1874).
35. 225 S.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 159 (1954).
[Vol. 8
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gether with interest and attorney's fees. Defendant filed a plea of
bankruptcy, admitting that the complainant was not listed as a cre-
ditor therein, but averring that it had actual notice thereof. The
trial judge, upon motion, and treating the answer as "sham", entered
judgment for the complainant on the pleadings for the full sum sued
for. On appeal this ruling was reversed in small part, the court
tolding that, although a claim for taxes due the United States and
a State are not dischargeable in bankruptcy (and here complainant
was treated as succeeding to the rights of California under this pro-
tection), complainant was entitled to recover only the amount of
taxes it paid to the State of California, with interest up to but not
beyond the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. As to attorney's
fees and other expenses incurred by complainant in paying the claim
to the State, these would be contractual obligations, and barred by
defendant's discharge in bankruptcy, if, upon trial, it be proved that
complainant had actual notice of defendant's petition in bankruptcy
and failed to file its claim. In short, the trial court erred in strik-
ing the whole of the answer as "sham" where, in part, it raised a
valid issue which should be tried on the facts. The court's view in
this regard appears to be unassailable. Indeed, while the precise
question of substance is an original one in this jurisdiction, the court
,quite logically adopted the view of the considerable weight of authori-
ty elsewhere in interpreting the applicable section of the Bankruptcy
Act.88
S. C. Mental Healtfi Commission v. May, Admr.37 Here the court
'had for consideration the sole question of whether or not a claim of
the State Mental Health Commission and its predecessor against
the estate of a deceased (an inmate of the State Hospital from 1911
until his death in 1952) was barred by the statute of limitations
38
in whole or in part. The trial court had held that only so much of
the claim was recoverable as accrued after the establishment of the
,complainant commission under the Mental Health Act of 1952, 39
but, in reversing the trial court as to this ruling, the reviewing court
held that Section 10-104340 had no application, where, as here, a spe-
cial statute41 required the Board to present its claim for support of
the deceased inmate to his personal representative "upon the death"
of the latter [deceased], and, further, that rights accruing to the
-predecessor Commission were not destroyed, by the adoption of the
36. 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (a) (3).
37. 226 S.C. 108, 83 S.E. 2d 713 (1954).
38. COD OF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-143.
39. 48 STATUTS AT LARGE 2042 (1952).
40. COD4 OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
41. CoD4 OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 32-975.
19551
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1952 Act, but passed to the new Board under that act. Without
direct authority in point from this jurisdiction the court cites cases.
from others. Particularly in point is the case of State ex. rel. Milli-
gan v. Ritter's Estate.42
Dobson v. Randolph & American Indemnity Co.43 Complainant
sued a public carrier for $50,000 damages for personal injuries re-
ceived in a collision. The carrier had been issued a "Class R" certi-
ficate upon which indemnity insurance, in total sum of $50,000, was
required. The American Indemnity Co., which issued its policy to
the carrier in said amount and which was named as co-defendant in
the action, moved to strike from the complaint the allegation that
there was $50,000 indemnity insurance. This motion was granted by
the trial court, and, on appeal, this order was reversed, two of the
justices dissenting. The majority reasoned that since the laws of
South Carolina 44 provide that the Public Service Commission shall
require liability insurance, "in such amount as the Commission may
determine," and since the Commission, acting under its Rules 57 and
58, provided for $50,000 indemnity insurance, as a prerequisite of a
"Class E" certificate, that the fact that such policy would be proper-
ly admissible in evidence, made it proper to plead the amount of
same. The dissenting view was that while the commission fixed the
overall liability insurance at $50,000, it also, under other rules, pro-
vided for a limitation of $5,000 liability for the bodily injury or death
of one person, and $1,000 for property damage. Logically the view
of the dissent seems correct. Since the indemnity company may be
sued as a co-defendant here, and, assuming that it is proper to al-
lege the amount of its policy of indemnity, the complainant should
not be allowed to plead it as being $50,000 for personal injuries to a
single individual, where the Commission, which it had the right to
do, has seen fit to limit it to $5,000. This would appear to be mis-
leading to the jury and prejudicial to the indemnity company.
Appeal and Error
Thomas & Howard Co. v. Fowler et al.4 5 Here there was an ac-
tion in which the defendants counterclaimed upon the ground that
the complainant fraudulently induced defendants to execute a chat-
tel mortgage, recording same in violation of an agreement not to do
so, thereby causing other wholesalers to refuse to grant defendants
42. 221 Ind. 456, 48 N.E. 2d 993, 998 (1943).
43 .... S.E. 2d .... (S.C. 1955).
44. COD or? LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 58-1451.
45. 85 S.E. 2d 278 (S.C. 1955).
[Vol. &
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further credit. Complainant moved to make the counterclaim more
definite and certain 46 by naming such wholesalers. The trial court
so ordered. Defendants' appeal from such order was dismissed on
the ground that such order was not appealable. The reviewing court
reasoned that the grant of such an order was within the trial court's
discretion, and, that, since it did not involve the merits, it was not
appealable before final judgment, especially where, as here, the in-
formation elicited was within defendants' sole possession. 47 This
case seems entirely sound under the numerous South Carolina au-
thorities cited by the court.
4 8
46. CODE or LAws Or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-606.
47. 81 S.C. 354, 62 S.E. 404 (1908).
48. See note 17 supra for the first appeal of this case.
19551
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